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Abstract
The protests that swept the Arab Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are expected to have influenced two key civic atti-
tudes fundamental to well-functioning democracies: trust and tolerance. However, systematic comparative assessments
of the general patterns and particularities in this region are rare. This contribution theorizes the uprisings’ impact and
presents new society-level measurements of trust and tolerance for the MENA, synchronizing over 40 Arab Barometer
and World Values Survey surveys on Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen, from
before and after the uprisings. The analyses firstly show political-institutional trust falling in the uprisings’ aftermath in
countries that went through democratic reform or regime change. It appears that politicians misbehaving and reforms
not resolving social problems hurt people’s trust in politics. Secondly, in democratic transition countries Egypt and Tunisia,
a decrease in social trust reflected the pattern of political-institutional trust indicating a spill-over effect. Thirdly, ethno-
religious tolerance dropped region-wide after the uprisings, indicating that the aftermath of religious conflict impacted the
entire Arab region. These results support rational-choice institutionalist theories, while at the same time refining them for
the MENA context.
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1. Introduction
During the Arab uprisings, millions took to the streets.
The public was fed up with corruption, poverty, unem-
ployment, suppression, and inequality. Moreover, peo-
ple did not trust institutional procedures and ruling politi-
cians to solve these problems (e.g. Heydemann, 2013;
Longley Alley, 2013; Robbins, 2015). While a lack of po-
litical trust was clearly at the root of these uprisings, we
still know little about how the protests and their after-
math influenced people’s civic attitudes, including polit-
ical and social trust and tolerance. Yet these civic atti-
tudes are crucial in establishing a sustainable democratic
system in which people accept the outcomes of the po-
litical process and realize that they can hold their gov-
ernment accountable through elections (e.g. Fish, 2002;
Geddes, 2007; Gibson, 2009; Inglehart, 1997; Norris,
2011). It thus is important to ask how the Arab uprisings
affected political-institutional trust, interpersonal trust,
and ethno-religious tolerance across theMiddle East and
North Africa (MENA).
Some MENA case studies suggest that both the
protests and the subsequent lack of clear change to-
ward democracy or reduction in economic hardship im-
paired public opinion considerably. For instance, as Hey-
demann (2013, p. 59) writes on Syria, “the democratic
aspirations of the protesters who filled streets and pub-
lic squares…were among the conflict’s first casualties”.
And on the failed transition in Egypt, Brown (2013, p. 53)
states that by discrediting democratic promises all that
remained was “a cloud of distrust and suspicion”. Still,
any systematic theorization or empirical assessment of
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how trust and tolerance have developed under the up-
risings is lacking.
Though themoreWestern oriented literature on civic
attitudes provides an important background to under-
standing the uprisings’ impact, it cannot provide ready-
made answers. While it shows that trust and tolerance
are relatively stable, driven by slow endogenous pro-
cesses and shaped by institutional contexts (cf. Mish-
ler & Rose, 2001; Van der Meer & Dekker, 2011; Zmerli
& Hooghe, 2011), the literature also acknowledges that
these civic attitudes are subject to contextual shocks (e.g.
political events) and that our knowledge on this is limited.
So while we have learned from (empirically supported)
rational-choice theories that a country’s political and eco-
nomic developments, such as economic performance, af-
fect its citizens’ attitudes (Easton, 1975; Gibson, 2009;
Hutchison & Gibler, 2007; Rose &Mishler, 2011), and we
know from sociological and classic institutionalism that
religio-cultural differences, economic processes, and po-
litical institutional arrangements socialize generations in
certain base levels of trust and tolerance (Growiec &
Growiec, 2014; Inglehart, 1997; Lühiste, 2006), it is less
clear how and under which conditions shocks, like the
uprisings, actually influence trust and tolerance.
By combining these existing insights with specific
observations from case studies and unique compara-
tive empirical MENA material on the recent events, this
study will (a) provide new empirical insights into both
the impact of the Arab uprisings, and whether and how
this impact differs across the region; (b) empirically as-
sess the applicability of existing theories—which are
mainly grounded in Western democracies and Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE)—to the MENA region; (c) ex-
plore the conditions under which the uprisings are found
to have had an impact, explaining differences across the
region; and (d) consequently generate new empirically-
grounded theoretical insights on what drives changes in
these supposedly stable civic attitudes of trust and toler-
ance, feeding back into existing theories.
Empirically, I present diachronic and synchronic com-
parisons of nine MENA countries and over forty surveys.
These comparisons have become possible by the syn-
chronization of Arab Barometer and World Value Sur-
vey (WVS) data in the PRiME project.1 The diachronic
comparisonwill help lay bare longer-term developments,
which is crucial for establishing whether changes in atti-
tude before and after the uprisings are not merely part
of a larger trend such as generational replacement (cf.
Robbins, 2015). The synchronic nine-country comparison
then assesses the conditions (e.g. countries’ institutions
and the uprisings’ form) under which the uprisings have
influenced people’s trust and tolerance.
2. Theoretical Background
There is a vast literature on political trust, interpersonal
trust and tolerance. And before turning to the more spe-
cific expectations of the uprisings’ impact, I will provide
a general background of the existing explanatory theo-
ries for the developments in these civic attitudes. As this
study has set out to explain society-level developments
in trust and tolerance and the differences between coun-
tries therein, macro-level explanations will be the focus
here. Using this literature, I will then formulate specific ex-
pectations for these civic attitudes, which, although their
general frames are similar, are thought to are explained
by different specific factors (see e.g. Newton, 2001).
2.1. Explaining Macro-Level Civic Attitudes
A first important frame for understanding any develop-
ment in civic attitudes over time is found in sociological
institutional approaches, which mainly predict stability
and slow changes. The economic and cultural situation
both in a country and in intermediary societal groups
are said to socialize generations into certain base levels
of trust and tolerance, particularly at a young age (Eas-
ton, 1975; Gibson, 2009; Inglehart, 1999). In this vein,
Growiec and Growiec (2014), for instance, argue that a
way out of the low-trust trap in the transitional CEE coun-
tries is economic modernization. Logically, this approach
sees generational replacement as an important driver of
(slow gradual) change (seeGibson, 2009; Inglehart, 1997;
Mishler & Rose 2001; Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011).Moreover,
sociological institutionalism helps to explain differences
between countries based on their different economic
structures and cultural backgrounds, as for instance illus-
trated by Lühiste (2006) on the post-communist Baltic
states, where political trust still suffers from the legacy
of authoritarian communist rule.
Related to this approach is the classic institutionalist
approach that focuses on the formal institutional con-
text in which people live. This approach mainly helps
to understand differences between countries. Stressed
most in this respect is the difference between authori-
tarian and other regimes, the former’s control over the
people and its suppression of opposing ideas leading to
low civic-attitude levels (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Zmerli &
Hooghe, 2011). This phenomenon has also been linked
to lasting effects after transitions to more open systems
in the CEE (see Marinova, 2011; Murray, 2008). At the
same time, as the transitions in the CEE have illustrated,
regime types can change and this provides some explana-
tions for changes in civic attitudes (Murray, 2008). Partic-
ularly, this approach puts forward that no short-termmir-
acles should be expected from democratic transitions, as
they lead to the breakdown of existing structures and
the general disappearance of certainties. Consequently,
already relatively low levels of civic attitudes cannot be
expected to increase overnight or might even decrease
(see Raiser, Rousso, & Steves, 2004), nor will unpopular
groups be liked all of a sudden (cf. Gibson, 2009).
To explain more rapid and short-term changes, the
rational-choice-based frame provides most apt explana-
1 Political and Religious attitudes and behavior in the Middle East.
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tions. This approachmainly focuses on people’s recent ex-
periences (Easton, 1975; Gibson, 2009). And although this
seems to shift the focus to the micro level, it still is rele-
vant to this study, as societal-level events shape people’s
subjective experiences (Hutchison & Gibler, 2007; Rose
& Mishler, 2011), and because it has been shown that so-
ciotropic perceptions can outweigh egocentric ones (Gib-
son, 2009, p. 418).More concretely, from this perspective
we can deduce that for instance economic performance
and religious cleavages at the societal level affect peo-
ple’s civic attitudes, and that these macro-level factors
thus help explain different levels of trust and tolerance
between societies and within societies over various years.
2.2. Theorizing the Impact of Political Shocks in the
MENA Region
The institutional and rational-choice approaches dis-
cussed above provide important background knowledge
for analyzing the Arab uprisings’ impact on civic attitudes
in the MENA. The first assumption that can be made is
that society-level civic attitudes are expected to have al-
ready been relatively low before the uprising. Secondly,
civic attitudes are expected to be relatively stable over
the roughly 14 years studied here. Thirdly, both the clas-
sic institutionalist and the rational-choice frame suggest
that major political events—revolution, war, terrorist at-
tacks, and regime change—can have considerable im-
pact, at least in the short and mid-to-long term.
At the same time, the relative idiosyncrasy of such
events also ensures that any insights derived from the
existing frames are difficult to generalize, as illustrated
by the two relatively recent political shocks that have re-
ceived attention in the literature: 9/11 and the demo-
cratic wave across CEE. Studies on 9/11 show that, as
a result of a new threat perception, political trust in
the U.S. surged and tolerance decreased (e.g. Chanley,
2002; Davis & Silver, 2004; Gross, Aday, & Brewer, 2004;
Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). However, studies on
the transition to democracy in CEE suggest that uncer-
tainty inhibits any increase in political-institutional trust
in a newly less-authoritarian context, though the transi-
tionmight actually strengthen trust in informal networks
as compensation (see Growiec & Growiec, 2014; Mari-
nova, 2011; Murray, 2008; Raiser et al., 2004). These re-
sults suggest that political shocks have no single unequiv-
ocal effect; the impact of such events depends on the
characteristics of the shock and context. So the first very
general expectation in this study is that the impact of the
uprisings differs considerably across countries and the
different civic attitudes (Expectation 1).
Moreover, any systematic assessment of the upris-
ings’ impact on civic attitudes in the MENA should thus
dovetail the general frames discussed above with the
country specificities and the institutional differences
across the region. Below, I will therefore address the
three civic attitudes focused on in this study—polit-
ical-institutional trust, interpersonal trust and ethno-
religious tolerance—one by one and address the claims
made about these civic attitudes in the MENA country
studies after the uprisings. By doing so from the perspec-
tive discussed above, I can formulate new, partly explo-
rative, expectations on the uprisings’ impact.
2.3. Trust
Generally, political and interpersonal trust correlate at
the societal level. Some have argued that political-
institutional trust partly depends on people’s more gen-
eral interpersonal trust (e.g. Lühiste, 2006), while others
argued that both have their own dynamics, at least at the
individual level (e.g. Kaase, 1999; Newton, 2001). Unfor-
tunately, claims about the Arab uprisings do not clearly
distinguish between these two forms of trust. Yet to for-
mulate clear expectations, this distinction is important.
Political-institutional trust, or political trust, in short,
refers to people’s acknowledgment of the government’s
authority and their willingness to accept the outcomes of
the government’s decision making as they believe politi-
cians generally act fairly (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011, p. 3).
Interpersonal or social trust, on the other hand, refers
to the belief that other people are generally willing to
behave in ways that are not detrimental to others, thus
measuring theway people “evaluate the trustworthiness
of the world they live in” (Benson & Rochon, 2004; New-
ton, 2001, p. 203).
Political-institutional trust. Brown (2013) and Rob-
bins (2015) link the failed transition in Egypt to a grow-
ing distrust of political authorities, but they neglect to
explain why a drop in trust should be expected. Given
Egypt’s longstanding authoritarian history and malfunc-
tioning government it is likely that political trust was
already low or gradually declining, unless the regime
change and free elections actually boosted trust at first.
In this line, for Yemen, Longley Alley (2013, p. 89) talks
about a strain due to economic hardship felt by millions
of Yemeni, indicating trust was already low but did not
drop in any major way. Or, as Boduszyński and Pickard
formulate explicitly for Libya, “Libya’s past—not only the
years of the Qadhafi regime but also decades under bru-
tal Italian colonial rule and then a corrupt monarchy—
has made many Libyans deeply distrustful of all central
authority” (2013, p. 89).
These accounts echo the literature on political trust
in (transitioning) authoritarian regimes, but it does not
become clear why a low but stable trust is (implicitly) ex-
pected in some cases while a decrease is noted in others.
Combining these case insightswith the general literature,
however, leads me to formulate at least two concrete ex-
pectations. Firstly, only in the cases where political trust
was relatively high can a drop be expected due to the
introduced uncertainty (Expectation 2). Secondly, as a
response to the uprisings some governments initiated
some democratic reform (e.g. Morocco) or experienced
a successful democratic transition (e.g. Tunisia). In those
cases, a rational-choice institutional approachwould sug-
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gest that (a) trustmight have risen as political authorities
becamemore responsive, but also that (b) this newfound
trustwas not amatter of long-term socialization and thus
still fragile. Citizens whowere disappointed by the actual
economic and political results of the uprisings—for in-
stance, politicians falling back into old authoritarian and
sectarian political habits (e.g. Egypt)—can then be ex-
pected to lose their newly-found political trust, the latter
even dropping below original levels, as the “good guys”
also turn out to be similarly untrustworthy or hungry for
power (Expectation 3).
Interpersonal trust. Boduszyński and Pickard’s discus-
sion of Libya (2013, p. 91) talks about a general “trust
deficit”, one particularly linked to intra-country cleav-
ages. This is unlikely to be restricted to Libya, as the en-
tireMENA shares a (neo-)colonial history in which ethno-
religious divides have become salient after the colonial
powers drew their own borders. To illustrate, in 1915,
British diplomatMark Sykes, staring at amap, is recorded
to have said: “I should like to draw a line from the ‘E’ in
Acre to the last ‘K’ in Kirkuk” (Barr, 2011). Moreover, or
consequently, many people in the MENA do not solely
identify as Libyan,Moroccan, or Yemeni, but also as Arab
citizens or part of the Umma,2 and many share a lan-
guage, and thus media accounts of what happens in one
country easily reach citizens of and in another country.
The observations in country studies suggest that the
uprisings have harmed interpersonal trust. Looking more
closely at the regional conditions and linking these to the
experiences as focused on in the rational-choice approach,
it can expected that in the countries that are ethno-
religiously diverse and where the protests were organized
by particular ethnic or religious groups (e.g. Bahrain, Iraq,
Lebanon), the violence and upheaval might have harmed
trust in “people” in general (Expectation 4). Considering
the Arab regional identity and the fact that interpersonal
trust refers to “theworldpeople live in” (see above)means
that increased group tensions during the uprisings can also
be expected to have harmed interpersonal trust across the
region, albeit to a weaker degree (Expectation 5).
In addition, the above arguments on political trust
might also apply to interpersonal trust, as, in several
countries, people came to power who had not been con-
sidered part of the political elite before. Their actions
might not only influence people’s political trust, but also
rub off on people’s general views on theworld’s trustwor-
thiness. Particularly in countries experiencing a demo-
cratic transition as well as untrustworthy and corrupt
new leaders, we can thus also expect interpersonal trust
to drop (Expectation 6).
2.4. Tolerance
In the Western political science literature, tolerance is
generally defined as being prepared to extend civil rights
to disliked societal groups (e.g. Communists, Muslims,
feminists) (see Djupe & Calfano, 2012; Scheepers, Gijs-
berts, & Coenders, 2002). Possibly due to the general ab-
sence of guaranteed civil rights, the common conceptu-
alization of tolerance in non-Western countries instead
centers on the extent to which people from other back-
grounds are welcomed in the community, particularly
whether people object to having these “outsiders” as
neighbors (e.g. Ciftci, 2010; Moaddel, 2006; Spierings,
2014). Both conceptualizations tap into the same con-
ceptual focus: how people respond to others with differ-
ent worldviews.
The rational-choice and sociological-institutionalist
frames clearly direct this study’s assessment of so-
cial or ethno-religious tolerance to perceived so-
ciotropic threats. We can assume that the uprisings have
spread and heightened the threat perception because
of increased ethno-religious tensions, protests, and
conflicts—or at least that these tensions have become
more widely visible. Consequently, the uprisings are ex-
pected to have negatively impacted ethno-religious toler-
ance. Heydemann (2013, p. 65), for instance, talks about
the Syrian events having “led to partial sectarian cleans-
ing in rural areas, destroying longstanding patterns of
intersectarian tolerance between Sunni and minority vil-
lages in conflict affected areas”. This effect is expected
in MENA societies with clear ethno-religious cleavages
(Expectation 7), as well as across the region, since ethno-
religious tolerance is strongly connected to the shared
(neo-)colonial history of, and identity discourse in, the
MENA (Expectation 8).
3. Data and Methods
To assess the MENA region’s developments in trust and
tolerance and the differences between countries, I have
synchronized over 40 existing public-opinion surveys to
assess the impact of the uprisings on the civic attitudes.
Moreover, I embedded these data in a country classifi-
cation drawing from existing studies and media reports
in order to assess how differences in the uprisings’ im-
pact relate to differences in the countries’ protests and
their aftermath.
Based on the surveys, aggregated macro-level de-
scriptive statistics will be presented for 37 country-year
combinations. Because this study does not focus on
individual-level explanations of civic attitudes, macro-
level descriptive analyses are most suitable to assess
both whether trends and changes are due to specific out-
liers, as well as what the general developments are. This
approach combines the strengths of case knowledge and
those of representative public-opinion data as it not only
allows for systematic comparisons but also for a more ex-
ploratory assessment of the patterns, which might iden-
tify important factors not derived from the theories and
2 The WVS includes questions on the degree to which people identify with their country and with the Arab nation. These figures show that in almost all
country-years for which both are available, the identifications differ only slightly. Overall, on a scale from 0 (weakest) tot 3 (strongest), the means are
2.54 (nation) and 2.31 (Arab), indicating that people identify strongly with both.
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literature described above. In that sense, a visual descrip-
tive analysis of a limited number of countries is rather
demanding as regards the theoretical expectations, be-
cause each deviation needs to be considered and thus
can severely undermine any theoretical claim. In some in-
stances, additional statistical tests are used to establish
whether changes in the society-level attitudes are likely
to have been caused by chance—for instance if they are
relatively modest or only found in a few countries—and
these will be discussed in the text where relevant.3
3.1. Surveys
The statistical analyses in this study are based on Arab
Barometer (AB) andWVS data, three rounds each, which
have been synchronized in the PRiME project. A core goal
of this project is to create indicators for systematic com-
parative analysis even though different items are avail-
able across country-years. The exact procedures are dis-
cussed below. For eight countries at least one nationally
representative survey4 from before 2011 and one from
2013 or 2014 were available: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen.5 I also in-
cluded Tunisia, whose earliest survey is from 2011 (after
the ousting of Ben Ali, before the Constituent Assembly
elections), as its lasting democratic transition makes it a
good reference point, against the Egyptian case, to check
whether a transition’s success or failure makes much of
a difference.
3.2. Political-Institutional Trust
All surveys provide several specifications of the question
“how much trust do you have in [institution]?”6 Items
on four institutions were selected to create the macro-
level index: parliament, government or prime minister,
civil service, and media. Most surveys contain the first
two, and by adding the latter two all selected surveys
(see above) could be included. Factor analyses show that
the four all tap one underlying dimension.7 As the dif-
ferent items’ means were very similar (per country-year
that is), the arithmetic mean of available items per re-
spondentwas calculated, rescaled to run from0 to 1, and
aggregated per country–year. Several robustness checks
using alternate operationalizations resulted in highly sim-
ilar conclusions to the ones presented below. Where
relevant, sensitivity tests and important deviations are
discussed in the results section. The resulting indicator
of societal-level political-institutional trust per country-
year has a real minimumof 0.26 (Lebanon 2011) and real
maximum of 0.72 (Egypt 2011).
3.3. Interpersonal Trust
All surveys include only one dichotomous item, albeit a
widely used one, to measure interpersonal trust: “most
people can be trusted”.8 Without further synchroniza-
tion the 37 country–year scores could be calculated,
ranging from 0.12 (Lebanon 2013) to 0.56 (Egypt 2011).
3.4. Ethno-Religious Tolerance
The variation in available items was greatest for toler-
ance as concept. Still, most surveys did include several
items on objecting to people from certain societal groups
as neighbors, and these have been applied to studies of
tolerance before (e.g. Ciftci, 2010; Moaddel, 2006; Spier-
ings, 2014). From the “neighbor items”, I selected those
that allowed for including as many surveys as possible,
while at the same time representing a coherent concept
of tolerance, in this case ethno-religious tolerance: neigh-
bors from another religion, race, or country, people with
a migration background, and people who speak a differ-
ent language.
As the religion and race items are closest to the the-
oretical concept and present in most surveys (24), they
are used as synchronization benchmark. Yet further syn-
chronization is needed to create comparable aggregate
scores, because the “popularity” of the societal groups
and availability of items varies across country–years.
This synchronization entails a correction of each non-
benchmark item by an item-unique synchronization fac-
tor, which is calculated by comparing scores on surveys
that include both the benchmark items and the other
item.9 Consequently, six more country–years could be in-
cluded. For Egypt 2008 no neighbor item was present,
but the same synchronization procedure could be ap-
plied to an alternative item theoretically linked to this
concept of tolerance10 available in twoother surveys that
included the benchmark items. Additionally, the third AB
3 The models and figures are not controlled for individual-level characteristics such as age and education. First of all, because the number of macro-level
cases is relatively small in statistical terms. Secondly, because it is known that demographic changes only lead to slow and rather gradual changes. The
“raw figures” in the graphs are actually more informative: they show what the trends in civic attitudes were per country before the uprisings. I take
these trends explicitly into account when judging the changes after the uprisings.
4 If available, post-stratification weights are applied.
5 Bahrain and Sudan are excluded. The 2014 Bahrain sample included only seven of twelve regions, which makes it difficult to compare the two sur-
veys and assess developments in attitudes in Bahrain. Between the two Sudan surveys South Sudan became independent, troubling the validity of a
comparison.
6 A great deal; quite a lot; not very much; none at all.
7 PAF, oblimin, 20,330 respondents with scores on all four items; all factor loadings > 0.6, KMO 0.782, Bartlett’s test significant.
8 Possible answers: (1) most can be; (0) can’t be too careful.
9 The exact procedure can be obtained from the author. Briefly: weighted means are calculated only on the cases with valid benchmark—and other-item
scores. Each item has a conceptual minimum of 0. The benchmark mean is divided by the other-item mean: the synchronization factor. Valid scores
on the other item in all surveys are then multiplied by the synchronization factor. Consequently, the same group of respondents will have the same
aggregate tolerance score regardless of whether one used the benchmark or the other item.
10 “How important should having ancestors from Egypt be as requirement for somebody seeking citizenship of Egypt?”
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round did not include neighbor items, but askedwhether
“In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy less po-
litical rights than Muslims.”11 For five of the country–
years of those surveys, WVS surveys are available that do
include benchmark items. In this case, the synchroniza-
tion factor was calculated by comparing the WVS bench-
mark means with the AB political-rights means on ex-
actly the same country–years.12 This enabled five more
country–years to be included in the analyses below.
Based on the synchronized items, the final societal-
tolerance scores13 are calculated by taking the arithmetic
mean of all available items per respondent aggregated
per country-year (realminimum: 0.47 [Yemen 2013]; real
maximum: 0.92 [Lebanon 2011]). These figures can be
interpreted as proxies for the proportion of people that
do not object to people of another religion or race as
neighbors (the benchmark). Several alternative ethno-
religious tolerance operationalizations (covering fewer
country-years) are used to test the sensitivity of the be-
low conclusions to the followed procedure, which will
be discussed in the respective analysis sections. The pre-
sented general conclusions are robust.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Arab Uprisings
The expectations formulated in the theory section are
partly conditional on whether major protests took place,
whether these were organized along ethno-religious
lines, and whether they resulted in democratic reform
and regime change. The nine countries studied here are
therefore classified accordingly. Table 1 summarizes this
and makes the expectations formulated above more tan-
gible. For instance, the theoretical expectation on inter-
personal trust declining (Expectation 4) now implies that
such decline in trust should be found in Iraq, Lebanon,
and Yemen particularly (see Table 1) for the expectation
to hold.
Turning to these conditioning factors, I firstly dis-
tinguish between countries where major protests took
place in 2010–2011 and where they did not, whereby
I build on Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds (2013) by
defining “major protests” as large crowds protesting
over multiple days and protests spreading across the
country.14 Secondly, among the countries that saw such
protests, I can distinguish three where the protests
were strongly linked to ethno-religious differences: Iraq,
Lebanon, and Yemen. In Iraq, major protests revolved
around the issue of the Sunni militia Sons of Iraq, who
felt mistreated by the Shi’a-dominated government (Al
Jazeera, 2008; Dermer, 2014; The Daily Star, 2013); in
Lebanon, protests were driven by Sunnis protesting the
Shi’a-backed candidate nominated for Prime Minister
(e.g. Al Jazeera, 2011; Lutz, 2011); and in Yemen ethno-
religious separatist protests—major parties being North-
ern Houthis and Southern Islamist secessionists—quickly
led to violent conflict that saw political assassination at-
tempts and protesters being fired upon (see BBC, 2016;
Kasinof, 2016; Longley Alley, 2013, 2015).
Thirdly, as for the aftermath, institutional changes
are at the core of the expectations formulated above.15
Again building on Brownlee et al. (2013), I distinguish be-
tween countries where regime change took place and
those were it did not. In three of the nine, the full set of
institutional rules was replaced, leading to a fundamen-
tally different type of political system, but, as Table 1 in-
dicates, the outcomes are quite different. In both Egypt
and Tunisia a democratic transition took place, but in
Egypt this did not last, with the Qandil governments and
president Morsi rolling back the democratic transition
and the military aborting it completely (Brown, 2013);
whereas in Tunisia the Islamist Ennahda and the other
major parties more or less accepted the new rules (Net-
terstrøm, 2015). In Yemen, the regime collapsed and a
still ongoing civil war broke out. Among the countries
without regime change, a distinction can be made be-
tween countries that did introduce some reforms and
Table 1. Protest and political change in nine MENA countries.
No major protest Protest driven by particular Broad, peaceful protest
religious or ethnic groups
No substantive change Algeria Iraq
Palestine Lebanon
Minor democratic reform Jordan Morocco
Unsuccessful democratization Egypt
Successful democratization Tunisia
State breakdown Yemen
11 Possible answers: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
12 The exact procedures can be obtained from the author. Only Muslim respondents are included, and weights assured similar survey sizes for AB and
WVS per country-year.
13 Palestine 2006 included no suitable data.
14 The differences with Brownlee and colleagues’ classification are caused by my exclusion of their criterion that the protesters occupied public places,
which is less relevant to this study’s central question.
15 Opposed to, for instance, financial appeasement or firing state officials.
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those where this was not the case. Though the leaders
of most of these countries did not see fit to announce
and implement political-institutional reforms, in Jordan
more freedom of expression was allowed and in Mo-
rocco some of the king’s powers have been transferred
to elected politicians (Dalacoura, 2012).
4.2. Political-Institutional Trust
To start with the developments before the uprisings,
Figure 1 shows a distinct downward trend in political-
institutional trust across the region, with only three ex-
ceptions.16 Remarkably, the latter are all found around
2006–2007. This sudden increase might relate to the
2006 Lebanon war, which in the Arab MENA is gen-
eral perceived to have been won by Hezbollah, defeat-
ing Israel (e.g. El-Husseini, 2015). Governments also
claimed this victory, with Syrian president Assad, for in-
stance, identifying himself with a growing Arab resis-
tance against Israel (Al-Assad, 2006). It is not unlikely
that a rally-around-the-flag mechanismmight have been
at play here, with the public feeling positive about the
Arab leaders’ performance.17 Evidently, this explanation
deserves more research (e.g. why does Algeria deviate
from the pattern?)18 but that is beyond the scope of this
study. The main observation here is a long-term down-
ward trend in political-institutional trust, which seems to
have fed the uprisings.
Ignoring the existing trend discussed above could
lead to overestimating the impact of the uprisings. For
instance, the decline in Palestine is hardly a trend break,
and the declines in Jordan and Morocco are more mod-
est than onemight have concluded simply comparing the
2011 and 2013–2014 figures. More generally, Iraq and
Lebanon show no clear increases or decreases. Trend-
breaking drops were found in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Tunisia, and Yemen—the five countries that saw regime
change or some democratic reform (see Table 1). It is
worth zooming in on this connection.
The drops in political-institutional trust are strongest
in the three regime-change countries. Egypt and Tunisia
saw a democratic transition and had relatively high trust
levels just after the uprisings. For instance, in 2011, af-
ter Mubarak’s ousting and Egypt’s first democratic elec-
tions, trust was considerably higher than in 2008, the
year of the previous survey. However, neither in Egypt
nor in Tunisia did the high trust turn out to be durable.
The undemocratic behavior in Egypt can partly explain
the major drop in trust, but in Tunisia, with its rather
stable democratization, trust likewise dropped. Consid-
ering the socio-economic problems at the core of the up-
risings, it seems important that both governments did
not solve these issues overnight. The remaining socio-
economic problems can explain the nullification of the
democratization trust boost. Also, the results for Jor-
dan and Morocco further support this reasoning. Both
countries saw minor democratic reforms, and though
the decline in trust seemed to be slightly weakened at
first, trust declined more strongly again some years af-
ter the reforms. Finally, in Yemen a minor increase in
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Figure 1. Political-institutional trust in nine MENA countries (2001–2014).
16 Based on all the consecutive surveys between 2001 and 2011, with the exception of Egypt, for which the 2011 survey was not included as this was
conducted after the fall of Mubarak and the parliamentary elections.
17 Further support comes from Israel’s main antagonist Palestine having the highest trust score in 2006. Methodological explanations are less convinc-
ing: country–years with both a WVS and AB survey do not show a consistently higher score on the WVS data, from which the 2006–2007 data stem;
item-difference is unlikely to have caused the pattern, as similar effects are found for parliament scores only.
18 The Egypt 2008 deviation is explained by being the only survey without items on either parliament or the executive branch.
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trust was seen in the first survey after Saleh handed
over power and signed the transition plan in 2012. How-
ever, the later complete breakdown of the country and
the outbreak of civil war made political trust drop to a
low. It seems that initial reforms had positive effects in
all five countries, but as people’s (socio-economic) prob-
lems were not resolved their daily experiences did not
change. Consequently the uprisings ultimately harmed
political trust as people became disappointed in the
performance of their (new) governments and institu-
tional elites.
Algeria seems to be a major exception to this mech-
anism, with trust strongly increasing between 2011 and
2013, though no institutional reformwas introduced (see
Table 1). A closer look, however, suggests that the 2012
parliamentary elections might have had the same effect
as reforms in other countries. Even though no substan-
tial institutional changes accompanied them, they were
internationally considered to be relatively democratic (Al
Arabiya, 2012; Al Jazeera, 2012). This explanation fits the
larger pattern discussed above, but for that to hold fu-
ture studies with data from 2014 onwards should also
show lower levels of trust, since Algeria’s government
has also not solved its larger social problems, which
include corruption and unemployment (Cheref, 2016;
World Bank, 2016).
Overall, a general negative trend in political trust be-
fore the uprisings was followed by a more differentiated
impact of the uprisings, as is also confirmed by additional
statistical models.19 In the conclusion, I will return to the
theoretical expectations.
4.3. Interpersonal Trust
Before the uprisings, a trend of decline is found for in-
terpersonal trust, albeit a somewhat weaker one than
for political trust. Moreover, the publics of Morocco
and Yemen show rather stable levels of interpersonal
trust, and some increases are even found as well. Still,
a pooled overall regression model on the surveys from
before the uprisings shows a statistically significant neg-
ative trend.20
Turning to the uprisings, initially high levels of in-
terpersonal trust or considerable increases are found
just after the uprisings in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and ar-
guably Palestine.Marked declines, partly following these
increases, were found for Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. This
cluster of three is hard to fit with the distinctions pre-
sented in Table 1, given that in the two other countries
that saw reform or institutional change, Morocco and
Yemen, interpersonal trust was rather stable. As such, a
declining interpersonal trust cannot be linked to, for in-
stance, the uprising being organized along religious lines.
The only pattern that seems to appear is that decreases
in social trust are found after a few years in countries
that have seen a democratic transition, but where social
and economic problems remain strong (Egypt, Tunisia),
as will be elaborated on in the conclusion.
4.4. Ethno-Religious Tolerance
For tolerance, the overall pattern is certainly not one
of decline; rather stable at first, it seems to be increas-
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Figure 2. Interpersonal or social trust in 9 MENA countries (2001–2014).
19 A two-level regression model with respondents embedded in countries shows a negative and significant impact of “years since 2001”; a dummy mea-
suring the impact of the uprisings shows no overall negative and significant effect, but including it in the model’s random part shows the uprisings’
effect to differ significantly between countries.
20 Respondents embedded in country-years in countries, with random intercepts and “years since 2001” as core explanatory factor.
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ing towards 2010 and 2011, indicating some kind of
public unification just before the uprisings. The 2007
dips in Jordan and Morocco are exceptions that mirror
the increased political trust there (cf. Figures 1 and 3).
The increased saliency of the Arab-Israeli conflict due to
the Lebanon war might have simultaneously decreased
ethno-religious tolerance, as under those circumstances
more people have had Jewish people in mind when they
were asked about neighbors with another religion. Addi-
tional analyses provide further support for the idea that
it was particularly the tolerance towards Jewish people
that decreased during those years.21
The developments following the uprisings are strik-
ingly uniform: in all nine countries we see a decline be-
tween 2010–2011 and 2012–2013. Across the MENA,
tolerance towards people of other ethno-religious back-
ground seems to have decayed in the first years after the
uprisings—though it should be noted that in Egypt, Jor-
dan, and Yemen it has been rising again since 2012 or
2013. Onemight seek an explanation for this region-wide
decline in the different survey item included in the third
AB round, but a similar pattern is also found when only
including the item on neighbors from a different religion
or only including the different years of one survey type
(WVS or AB).
Regarding the most recent increases, we should cau-
tious interpreting these, partly because 2014 data are
only present for two countries. It thus cannot be said
whether this is a region-wide effect or a more country-
specific one. The core finding for now is that across the
region the short-term effect of the uprisings and their af-
termath is one of decreasing ethno-religious tolerance.
5. Conclusions
After the Arab uprisings rocked the MENA region more
than five years ago, a great deal has been said about
the uprisings’ impact, including their impact on the civic
attitudes of the people, of whom so many took to the
streets from late 2010 onwards. At the same time, a sys-
tematic account of how civic attitudes such as trust and
tolerance have developed across the region has so far
remained lacking. In this study, I set out to shed more
light on this issue by both comparing civic attitudes in
the Arab MENA after the uprising with the trends before
the uprisings and comparing these developments among
MENA countries.
The analyses did not show the region-wide drop in
political-institutional trust that was suggested in some
MENA-country case studies. As Robbins noted, the dif-
ferences in transitions and outcomes need to be un-
derstood to explain the effects on public opinion (Rob-
bins, 2015, p. 87). However, the results do not resemble
a picture of immediate decreasing trust in democratic
transition countries (Expectation 2), as was expected
based on the CEE literature (e.g. Growiec & Growiec,
2014; Murray, 2008). It was in countries that have
seen major or minor institutional democratic reforms—
or that moved towards democracy through relatively
democratic elections—where political trust at first in-
creased. However, the countries where democratization
took place also then showed a declining political trust
later on, in some case rather severely. As Longley Alley
(2013) observed for Yemen, a likely cause for this is that,
despite the institutional changes, the economic ills re-
mained, harming the newfound trust in said political in-
stitutions. This initial increase and later decline supports
Expectation 3, as well as the CEE literature’s observation
that it is people’s experiences that count, not the actual
transition (see Guérin, Petry, & Crête, 2004).
People’s general trust in the world around them did
not show a region-wide response to the uprisings either,
nor was this interpersonal trust mainly harmed in coun-
tries where ethno-religious differences were at the root
Figure 3. Ethno-religious tolerance in nine MENA countries (2001–2014).
21 For Iraq, information on Jewish neighbors (not included in index) is available for both 2004 and 2006, showing a decline from 0.17 to 0.04.
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of the uprisings. This undermines Expectations 4 and 5.
The result did, however, support Newton’s (2001) more
general claim that the two types of trust correlate at the
societal level, as the reforms’ impact on societal trust
seem to be a reflection of their influence on political-
institutional trust. This is in line with Expectation 6, not-
ing that for this “negative spillover effect” from politi-
cal to general trust to occur, the political reforms under-
lying the disappointment must be major and the new
leaders—not hailing from the ruling elites—must take of-
fice first. Under those circumstances, the impact of polit-
ical events on people’s trust in the system and in politi-
cians seems to rub off on themore general interpersonal
trust, as was the case in Egypt and Tunisia. This con-
clusion seems to go against those in the CEE literature,
which more often discusses interpersonal trust as fertile
soil for political trust (Lühiste, 2006) or argues that peo-
ple compensate for a lack of political trust with trust in
informal networks (Marinova, 2011). TheMENA analyses
here suggest a new mechanism heretofore unexplored
in the literature: if new leaders not previously part of
the authoritarian ruling elite take over, changes in polit-
ical trust can spill over into more general trust, as these
new leaders in a way also represent the ordinary people
or “common man”. This pattern seems to be rather rele-
vant for Western societies too where “outsider” populist
leaders might become part of the governing elite, but
probably will not solve all supposed problems overnight
(cf. Rooduijn, 2013).
A decline in ethno-religious tolerance was found
across the MENA (Expectation 8), not just in countries
where ethno-religious violence or conflict broke out dur-
ing or following the uprisings (Expectation 7). In that
sense, the situation is more alarming than Heydemann’s
(2013, p. 65) warning about the events in Syria destroy-
ing intersectarian tolerance in areas affected by the con-
flict. Apparently, the general saliency of religious cleav-
ages and cross-border ethnic or religious identification
also facilitated a decrease in ethno-religious tolerance in
countries without salient religious conflicts within their
borders. It seems that in understanding the uprisings’ im-
pact on public opinion, transnational identities and dis-
courses should not be underestimated as drivers of peo-
ple’s threat perceptions. To further test and understand
these mechanisms, future in-depth interviews and sur-
vey case studies could focus on people’s perception of re-
ligious tensions across the region and on their tolerance
towards other ethno-religious groups, both in countries
where these conflict were very prominent (e.g. Bahrain,
Lebanon) as well as in countries where these tension are
far less so (e.g. Algeria, Tunisia).
All in all, this study’s results clearly support Expecta-
tion 1 that the impact of the uprising is not the same
for each civic attitude as well as Robbins’ (2015) claim
that the impact of political shocks like the Arab uprisings
are not unequivocal but conditional on the institutional
context and specific events in the different countries. To
understand what is going on in the MENA, it cannot be
stressed enough that the MENA region is no homoge-
nous bloc of authoritarian regimes.
At the same time, the patterns discussed above do in-
dicate that general mechanisms are at work, though they
translate differently depending on the context. Most
clearly, people’s experiences, particularly what they per-
ceive to be threats and how they feel about the political
elite’s performance, are key in understanding the upris-
ings’ impact on civic attitudes in the MENA. Though on
the one hand this is in line with the larger literature, on
the other there are particularities to the MENA that en-
sure results from studies on, for instance, CEE cannot be
translated directly to transitioning countries in theMENA
region. Most importantly, (1) the shared Arab identity
and language in theMENA seems to allow threat percep-
tions to travel across borders; (2) under economic stress,
as is the case in many MENA countries, the political per-
formance of new leaders is not just measured by how
these leaders deal with the new political order, but also
whether they solve existing economic problems (quickly);
and (3) if long-lasting authoritarian regimes transition
towards democracy, not at the hand of the ruling elite,
but through a takeover by people who did not belong to
these elites before, the new leaders not only represent
“politics”, but also the general people, and their perfor-
mance influences people’s perception of both.
In conclusion, the uprisings might have partly
stemmed from declining trust and increased tolerance,
but above all they have considerably affected public trust
and tolerance in the MENA, at least in the short term.
Despite some initial positive effects, the larger patterns
are all of decreasing trust and tolerance. The picture has
thus turned rather grim, as the conflicts following the up-
risings and the disappointment among the public seem
to have done more harm than good when it comes to
the civic attitudes that are fundamental to build stable
democracies with accountable governance for and by
the people. Still, some relief appears to be on the horizon:
from 2013–2014 onwards, civic attitudes did recover in
some countries. Future comparative surveys are needed
to see whether the uprisings were just a ripple, whether
these relatively stable civic attitudes will rise, return to
their prior levels, or sink even further.
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